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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRED D. HUDSON, dba Hudson 
Investment Co., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
BETTILYON'S, INC., a corporation 
dba Bettilyon's Construction Com-' 
pany, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDEN·r· 
No. 
10378 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff to collect 
the balance due on a promissory note, secured by an 
Assigment of Earnings to become due from a sub-
contract between Defendant, Bettilyon Construction 
Company, and one, Lynn Gawan, d/b/a Structural 
Components Company, for the installation of a roof 
structure on a building located at 2220 South 2nd West, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. The Defendant made one pay-
3 
ment to the Plaintiff under the Assignment, in the 
amount of $15,300.00, but prior to the time when the 
last payment came due, a lien in the amount of $17,-
879. 78 was filed against the building for materials 
furnished to the construction by General Builders 
Supply Company, Inc. Bettilyon Construction Com. 
pany paid the final payment to General Builders Sup. 
ply, Inc., and obtained a release of this lien and the 
Plaintiff now claims that he is entitled to have his 
promissory note paid by the Defendant, for its refusal 
to make the final payment to the Plaintiff in accord. 
ance with the Assignment of Earnings. 
DISPOSITION JN LOWER COURT 
After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Stewart 
M. Hanson issued a Memorandum Decision on March 
25, 1965, dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint, with preju· 
dice, on the following three grounds: 
I. The Assignment was an Assignment of Earn-
ings only. 
2. That the Plaintiff had been paid by receipt of 
a check of $15,300.00. 
3. That the Defendant was entitled to offset any 
amounts due Ga wan under Section 13 (j) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendant seeks to have the Judgment of 
the Lower Court sustained. 
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STATElHENT OF FACTS 
Defendant agrees with Plaintiff's second para-
graph in his Statement of Facts, but the remainder 
of the Statement contains information not material to 
the case or is argumentive. Therefore, Defendant 
chooses to summarize the facts of the case as follows: 
Bettilyon Construction Company, Defendant and 
Respondent (herein referred to as "Defendant"), was 
the General Contractor for the construction of an office 
and warehouse building for the owner, Freeway In-
dustrial Park, a corporation. On September 28, 1962, 
Defendant entered into a sub-contract agreement with 
Lynn Gawan, d/b/a Structural Components Company 
(Exhibit D-4), for the furnishing of labor and ma-
terials for the installation of a "glu-lam" roof structure, 
for a total contract price of $30,482.00. 
In the latter part of October, 1962, Gawan ap-
proached Plaintiff to borrow money and proposed to 
assign the sub-contract as security. On or about October 
25, 1962, Lynn Gawan presented the "Assignment of 
Earnings" (Exhibit P-9) to B. Lue Bettilyon, Presi-
dent of Bettilyon Construction Company, for signa-
ture ( T-38). The first and third paragraphs of the 
"Assignment of Earnings" were prepared in the office 
of the Plaintiff ( T-63) . The second paragraph was 
added by Mr. Bettilyon prior to his signature on the 
document ( T-59). 
Between the dates of November 12, 1962 and 
December 26, 1962, General Builders Supply Com-
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pany, Inc., furnished materials to the building project, 
ordered by Lynn Gawan, at a total valuation of $17,-
879. 78, but nothing was paid on this account by Lynn 
Ga wan. 
On December 20, 1962, Defendant issued a check 
for part payment on the sub-contract, made payable 
jointly to Structural Components Company and Hud-
son Investment Company (Exhibit D-2) . The check 
was endorsed by Hudson Investment Company, by 
Fred D. Hudson. On February 19, 1963, General 
Builders Supply Company, Inc., filed a lien against 
the construction property, in the amount of $17,879.78. 
When Lynn Gawan refused to discharge the said lien, 
Bettilyon Construction Company issued a check to the 
said lien claimant, in the amount of $15,182.00 (Ex-
hibit D-3) and obtained a release of the lien (Exhibit 
D-7). 
flaintiff now claims that the check (Exhibit D-3) 
should have been made payable to Plaintiff in accord-
ance with the terms of the Assignment. 
POINT I. 
POINT I. THE PARTIES DID NOT IN-
TEND TRI-LATERALLY THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF WOULD BE THE. JOINT 
p A YEE OF ALL OF THE PROCEEDS TO 
'VHICH THE SAID SUB-CONTRACTOR 
WAS ENTITLED UNDER THE TERMS OF 
6 
THE CONTRACT, BUT ONLY TO THE 
EARNINGS OF THE SUB-CONTRACTOR. 
The Plaintiff, in his argument, infers that the 
word "earnings" is a term with a variety of meanings. 
Actually, it is a commonly used word with a generally 
understood meaning and in the context of the "Assign-
ment of Earnings" (Exhibit P-9), it has a clear and 
concise meaning. In this case, it clearly means the 
profit, as contrasted to the gross income or gross pro-
ceeds from the contract. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "earnings" as 
"The gains of the person derived from his services or 
labor without the aid of capital. (Emphasis added). 
'Vithout the aid of capital, means the cost of 
labor or material or the capital contribution that a 
person must put into a job to earn a return. This 
intent is clearly evident from most of the decisions 
which have attempted to define the term and this mean-
ing is only lost in those cases where the Court is attempt-
ing to construe statutory definitions of the term or 
the meaning of the term under specific statutory usage. 
For example, Plaintiff, in his brief, refers to the 
case of Springville Coal Mining Co., Plaintiff in err. 
vs. State Industrial Commission, et al, Defendants, 
126 N .E. 133, 22 ALR 859, for the statement that 
"earnings are either gross or net earnings." This case 
does not stand for that proposition, but this was a situ-
ation involving the construction of the Workmen's 
Compensation Statute of Illinois and whether the 
7 
term "earnings" meant gross pay before the usual 
deductions. Obviously, this type of situation does not 
involve the common usage of the word; particularlv 
a sub-contract requiring the furnishing of labor a~d 
materials to a construction job. We have not found 
any cases (including those cited by the Plaintiff) that 
hold that the term includes an ambiguous concept of 
both "net earnings" and "gross earnings". 
A good example of the type of usage that we are 
referring to is found in the Montana case of Dayton 
vs. Ewart, 72 P. 420 (1903). In this case, the Appel-
lant had attached certain gold dust that had been mined 
by the Respondent and sold in satisfaction of a judg-
ment. The Respondent claimed that the gold dust was 
exempt from execution under a statute which provided 
that there should be exempt from execution "the earn-
ings of the judgment debtor for his personal services 
rendered. . . . " The Court said: 
"Between the terms 'wages' and 'salary' there 
is no material difference when they are applied 
to the subject here under consideration. The 
former term is commonly used to denote the 
compensation of laborers, and the latter that of 
.other persons of more permanent employment 
and more elevated stations. The term 'earnings' 
is more comprehensive than either of the others. 
It implies, as do they, that t~e sum due s~all be 
claimed for the personal services of the cla1ma~t, 
and that it shall not include, to any substantial 
extent, recompense for materials furnished; but 
earnings need not result from work done under 
the direction of another nor from manual labor." 
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The document the Court is asked to construe is 
entitled "Assignment of Earnings". The first para-
graph says: (Exhibit P-9) 
. "I, Lynn Gawan agree to assign all my earn-
mgs on ~ 30,482.00 co~tract, between myself 
and Bethlyon Construction Company job #E 
1262 dated 28 Sept. 1962, to the Hudson In-
vestment Company (313 East 9th South) to 
secure a note on myself by Hudson Investment 
Company". 
The only logical meaning that can be given to the 
term "earnings", under these circumstances, is the 
definition given by the case cited above. Mr. B. Lue 
Bettilyon, testified that the profit on this job would 
amount to approximately 203 to 253 (T 34-35). 
Mr. Lynn Gawan had submitted a bid and certainly 
knew the cost of the labor and materials that were to 
go into the construction of the roof. He also knew that 
under his contract and the general contract, that labor 
and materials would have to be paid before he could 
expect to receive his final settlement. Only by a wild 
stretch of the imagination is it possible to torture the 
meaning of the word "earnings" to include the cost 
and expense of labor and materials. 
One of the basic rules of construction is that "plain 
unequivocal terms or in terms susceptible of interpre-
tation and construction under recognized rules of law 
are bound by the meaning of the contract which is 
reached by a proper interpretation". 17 Am Jur (2d), 
358 (Contracts, Paragraph 21). The word "earnings" 
has only one meaning as used in this document. 
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The third paragraph of the Assignment of Earn-
ings (Exhibit P-9) has some interesting language. It 
says: 
"Bettilyon Construction Company agrees to 
make all checks and payments due on the above 
herein described job payable to Hudson Invest-
ment Company and Structural Components 
Company together and that no payments on this 
job will be made in any other manner. The above 
assignment is agreeable to Bettilyon Construc-
tion Company". 
The sub-contract agreement, Paragraph 13, In-
demnification, states: 
"The SUBCONTRACTOR agrees to satisfy 
immediately any lien pr encumbrance filed 
against the premises arising by reason of work 
performed pursuant to this Subcontract, or any 
work sublet by the said SUBCONTRACTOR, 
and to indemnify and save harmless the CON-
TRACTOR from and against any and all liens, 
suits, claims, actions, losses, costs, penalties, and 
damages of whatsoever kind or nature, includ-
ing attorney fees, arising out of, in connection 
with, or incident to the Agreement." 
Under this sub-contract, where a lien is filed prior 
to the final payment, the general contractor had the 
right to settle the claim and discharge the lien and 
it took all of the funds due on the sub-contract to 
settle the lien, then there were no ''payments due" 
under the contract. That is the situation in this case. 
Plaintiff has argued vaguely, that Paragraph 13, 
since it is on the reverse side of the document, does not 
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form a part of the sub-contract. However, Paragraph 
I entitled "The Contract Documents", has this provi-
sion in bold face print "THE PROVISIONS 
PRINTED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HERE-
OF ARE REFERRED TO AND l\1ADE A 
PART OF THIS AGREEMENT". Clearly, there 
is no question that the terms and conditions on the 
reverse side of the document can be incorporated into 
the agreement itself, if that is clearly the intent of the 
parties. In addition, the last line of the bottom of the 
first page of this sub-contract agreement states: "Pro-
visions printed on reverse side hereof are part of this 
Agreement and binding upon the parties hereto)". 
There certainly could be no question that the parties 
intended to bind themselves to the provisions on the 
reverse side of the document. 
The Plaintiff states that the Assignment (Exhibit 
P-9) was probably prepared by Lynn Ga wan. How-
ever, Mr. Fred Hudson testified as follows : ( T -63) 
Q Mr. Hudson, I presume this assignment, all 
except for the second paragraph, was prepared 
in your off ice, was it not 1 
A I don't know definitely, Mr. Bettilyon, but I 
was under the impression it was, but don't know 
definitely." 
This document certainly was not prepared by the 
Defendant, since when the document was presented to 
~Ir. B. Lue Bettilyon, he added the second paragraph 
and the two other paragraphs are obviously typed on 
a different typewriter. The authorship of this docu-
11 
ment must be credited to the Plaintiff and Plaintiff 
is not able to pass it off as a product of Mr. Lynn 
Gawan. Plaintiff relied upon this document; he re-
quired it as a condition of the loan that he made to 
Lynn Gawan and, therefore, in accordance with the 
rules of construction, it must be construed against the 
person preparipg the document. Thus rule is cited in 
17 Am Jur (2d} 689 (Contracts, Paragraph 276): 
"It is fundamental that doubtful language 
in a contract should be interpreted most strongly 
again~t the party who has selected that language, 
especially where he seeks to use such language 
to defeat the contract or its operation, unless 
the use of such language in the contract is pre-
scribed by law. Also, in case of doubt or ambi-
guity a contract will be construed most strongly 
against the party who drew or prepared it, or 
whose attorney drew or prepared it. Another 
form in which substantially the same rule is 
stated is that where doubt exists as to the con-
struction of an instrument prepared by one party 
thereto or his attorney, upon the faith of which 
the other has incurred an obligation, that con-
struction will be adopted which will be favor-
able to the latter." (See, also, Handley vs. Mu-
tual Life Insurance Company of New York, 
106 Utah 184, 147 P. (2d}, 319, 152 ALR, 
1278}. 
POINT 2. 
POINT 2. THERE WAS NO SEPARATE, 
VALID OR ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT 
THAT CAME INTO BEING BETWEEN 
12 
PLAINTIF:F AND DEFENDANT, IN THIS 
ACTION. 
The P!aintiff has set out, in his Brief, under Point 
:2, the reqmrements for an enforceable contract, includ-
ing a consideration. In this case, the Plaintiff has not 
alleged nor was any evidence, whatsoever, introduced 
as to the nature of the consideration for the so-called 
contract, between Hudson Investment Company and 
Bettilyon Construction Company. In fact, this was 
not even argued in the trial of the case in the District 
Court; this is new matter on this appeal. 
17 Am J ur ( 2d) 427 (Contracts, Paragraph 85), 
defines consideration as follows: 
"Technically, consideration is defined as some 
right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to one 
party, or some forbearance, detriment; loss, or 
responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by 
the other. Again, consideration for a promise is 
defined as an act or a forbearance ; or the crea-
tion, modification, or destruction of a legal rela-
tion; or a return promise bargained for and given 
in exchange for the promise. Consideration is, 
in effect, the price bargained for and paid for 
a promise--that is, something given in exchange 
for the promise." 
Defendant has received no "right, interest, profit, 
or benefit", nor has the Plaintiff given up anything 
of value to the Defendant. Interestingly, the Plaintiff 
does not even suggest, in his Brief, of what the con-
sideration consisted. Paragraph 86 on Contracts, in the 
same volume, states as follows: 
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. "It i~ w~ll settled, as a general rule, that con-
sideration 1s an essenti!l~ element ?f, and is neces-
sary to the enforceability or validity of, a con-
tract. It follows from this rule that a promise 
not supported by any consideration cannot 
amount to a contract or be enforced, and that 
want or lack of consideration is an excuse for 
nonperformances of a promise. In order for a 
contract to be :alid and binding, each party must 
be bound to give some legal consideration to the 
other by conferring a benefit upon him or suffer-
ing a legal detriment at his request". 
Since there was no consideration, it cannot now 
be claimed that Plaintiff and Defendant entered into 
a contract. 
POINT 3. 
POINT 3. PLAINTIFF WAS PAID. 
The Lower Court, in its Memorandum Decision, 
in Paragraph 2, made the following finding: 
"The Court finds that the Plaintiff was paid." 
The Plaintiff states, in his Brief, that it is difficult 
for him to understand on what basis this finding was 
made, but the Plaintiff admits that he received a check 
in the amount of $15,300.00 (Exhibit D-2), and that 
he endorsed this check. What he did with the funds 
from this check is immaterial in this lawsuit. In defin-
ing the term "payment", the Oklahoma Supreme Court, 
in the case of Hill vs. Henry, 124 P. (2d) 405, page 
408, says, " ... the term 'payment' ... denotes de-
14 
livery to the obligee (or creditor), in satisfaction of 
the claim or demand". In this case, a check for $15,-
300.00 was delivered to the Plaintiff. He endorsed 
it and he accepted it. The Defendant was entitled to 
rely upon delivery of the check and the cashing of the 
same by the Plaintiff, or anyone else to whom he 
delivered the check, after proper endorsement, as pay-
ment and as satisfaction of the claim. It is true that 
under these circumstances, such payment might have 
been received, but not intended by any of the parties 
as payment of the obligation, but if this were the case, 
then it would be mandatory upon the creditor to give 
clear and immediate notice to the assignee, that such 
payment was not accepted as payment in full. In this 
case, the Plaintiff stated, at the end of the case, after 
all of the evidence was in, that he telephoned Mr. B. 
Lue Bettilyon concerning the $15,300.00 check (T-65), 
but only inquired as to whether there was another pay-
'"' 
ment due. This conversation was denied by Mr. B. Lue 
Bettilyon ( T-66) . The Plaintiff, on cross-examination, 
in response to questioning concerning this check, testi-
fied (T- 39-40): 
"Q Did you discuss with Mr. Gawan the nature 
of this job? 
A He told me it was a roofing job, Sir. 
Q Did you ask him how much of the job would 
be materials and labor? 
A No, sir. 
Q But you realize that a great part of it would 
be materials and labor? 
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A Yes, sir; a certain part of it, certainly. How 
much, I don't know. 
Q Did he tell you that he was borrowing the 
money to pay for the materials? 
A No, sir. 
Q Why didn't you take any money out of the 
first check that was given to him? 
A Mr. Gawan said he was short on cash at that 
time, and there was considerable left, and the 
remainder of the payment would come due be-
fore the note was due. 
Q But you didn't bother to inquire about 
whether or not he paid material and labor bills 
on the job? 
A No, sir; I didn't. 
Q You didn't bother to inquire as to whether-
what the extent of those bills would be and how 
much would have to come out of the final check? 
A No, sir; I didn't. 
Q The assignment said, "I, Lynn Gawan, agree 
to assign to you all money earned on a $30,482.00 
contract," and you never at any tj-!lle asked him 
how much the earnings of the job were going 
to be? 
A I didn't feel I had to do so because Bettilyon 
Construction, with the acknowledgment, agreed 
to pay all payments on the job to me and the 
total amount of payments was over $30,000.00". 
Mr. B. Lue Bettilyon testified concerning this 
matter as follows T-34): 
"Q Now at the time that the check, Exhibit-
THE COURT: D-2 
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Q (By Mr. ~ettilyon) D-2 was delivered, did 
you ever receive any telephone call or inquiry 
from Hudson Investment Company relative to 
that? 
A No, I did not. 
'? Did ~udson Investment Company at any 
tune notify you that they had not received all 
of the proceeds of that check? 
A No. As a matter of fact, I assumed that they 
had. 
Q \V ould you have been able to help them if 
they had called you? 
A If they had called me prior to them endors-
ing the check, yes. 
Q What would you have told them? 
A I would have immediately investigated with 
General Builders Supply to find out if these 
material bills had been paid. 
Q But you never received any call or notice? 
A None whatever. The first notice I had of any 
problem was when General Builders Supply 
called about sometime late in December and 
there was quite an unpaid bill on the job." 
Surely, the Plaintiff, under these circumstances, 
had a duty and an obligation to put the contractor on 
notice that he was not being paid out of the $15,300.00 
check, and any risk that the Plaintiff took by not ob-
taining his money when he had opportunity, must be 
assumed by him and cannot now be passed onto an 
innocent third party, the Defendant in this case. 
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POINT 4. 
POINT 4. THE PLAINTIFF'S REcov. 
ERY IS BARRED BY RULE 13(j) OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF CIYIL PROCEDURE. 
Rule 13 (j ) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides as follows: 
"Except as otherwise provided by l,aw as to 
negotiable instruments and assignments of ac-
counts receivable, any claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim which could have been asse;ted 
against an assignor at the time of or before no-
tice of such assignment, may be asserted against 
his assignee, to the extent that such claim, count-
erclaim, or cross-claim does not exceed recovery 
upon the claim of the assignee." 
Plaintiff argues that the words "at the time of or 
before notice of such assignment" removes this rule 
from having effect in this factual situation because 
the assignment to the Plaintiff occurred sometime in 
October, 1963, and the materials were furnished during 
the dates of November 12, 1962, to December 26, 
1962. Plaintiff, therefore, argues that the right of the 
materialman and the right of the Defendant to offset 
did not arise until November 12, 1962. There are sev· 
eral reasons why this reasoning is faulty: 
(a) The rights of Bettilyon Construction Com· 
pany against Lynn Gawan arose at least with the 
execution of the sub-contract on September 28, 1962, 
and probably, even before this, as is pointed out 
below. An assignee of a non-negotiable claim cannot 
18 
stand in any better position than does his assignor. 
The assignee must take subject to all defenses or 
equities that could have been asserted or may at any 
time in the future be asserted against the assignor. 
This rule is stated in 6 Am. Jur. (2d), 282 (Para-
graph 102, Assignments) : 
" ... the general rule is that an assignee of a 
n.on-negotiable chose in action acquires no greater 
right than was possessed by his assignor, and 
simply stands in the shoes of the latter. 
In an action on the claim assigned, the as-
signee is ordinarily subject to any setoff or 
counterclaim available to the obligor against 
the assignor and to all other defenses and equi-
ties which could have been asserted against the 
chose in the hands of the assignor at the time of 
the assignment." 
:Mr. Hudson acknowledged on direct examination by 
his counsel that he saw the subcontract agreement 
(Exhibit D-4) prior to the time that he loaned the 
money to Gawan (T-29-30). He knew that the right 
of Mr. Gawan to receive any money was dependent 
upon his performance under the contract and his com-
pliance with all of the terms and conditions of the 
contract. He could not, at any time, acquire any 
greater rights than Mr. Gawan had in the contract. 
(b) The rights of a materialman do not date 
from the time of furnishing labor or materials, but 
the lien "shall relate back to, and take effect of, the 
time of the commencement to do work or furnish 
materials on the ground for the structure or improve-
19 
ment and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage 
or other encumbrance which may have attached sub-
sequently to the time when the building improvement 
or structure was commenced, work begun or first 
material furnished on the ground ... ," 38-1-5, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. Therefore, any assignment 
by a subcontractor would be subject to the prior claim 
of materialmen who furnished materials at the request 
of the subcontractor even though the materials were 
furnished after the assigmnent. 
( c) Another reason why Plaintiff's reasoning 
must fail is that under the provisions of 14-2-2, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, the owner of the property 
must require a bond from the general contractor and 
the general contractor from his subcontractors, or the 
owner of the property is directly liable to the material-
men or laborers who do work or furnish materials for 
the job, even though there is no direct contractual 
relationship between the owner and such material-
men or laborers. Therefore, under the general con-
tract, the owner has a right of off set against the gen-
eral contractor for payment of any liens that may be 
filed against the job, and the general contractor has 
the right of off set against the subcontractors for any 
liens that have not been paid, or as in this case, the 
general contractor has a right to pay the lien directly 
and discharge the same, and deduct the same out of 
the proceeds due the subcontractor. 
In this case, the rights of setoff against Lynn 
Ga wan, d/b/ a Structural Components Company, prob-
20 
ably dates back to the date of the original general con-
tract between the owner of the property and the gen-
eral contractor, Bettilyon Construction Company, be-
cause the subcontract agreement between Bettilyon and 
Gawan incorporates the general contract by reference 
in Paragraph l thereof (Exhibit D-4). In any event, 
the date of setoff certainly begins as of September 28, 
1962, the date of the subcontract. Rule 13 (j) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure therefore applies in 
this case. 
There is one other matter that we add to this Brief, 
perhaps immaterial, but we feel quite significant. The 
Plaintiff does not come into Court, in this matter, with 
clean hands. The note (Exhibit P-1) which he is at-
tempting to collect was, supposedly, purchased from 
one, Alden Gibbs, for a discount of between $750.00 
to $1200.00 (T-36). Yet, surprisingly, Mr. Hudson 
has never met Alden Gibbs, nor had any business deal-
ings with him (except for a telephone call) and, even 
more surprising, is the fact that the promissory note 
which, supposedly, was prepared for Alden Gibbs, con-
tains the provision "this note and interest thereon is 
secured by assignment of earnings on a $30,482.00 con-
tract between Structural Components Company and 
Bettilyon Construction Company. When Mr. Gawan 
went in to borrow money in the first place, he was in-
formed that it would have to be done by discounting 
a note (T-42). Mr. Gawan says the note was prepared 
in the office of Hudson Investment Company (T-42), 
and then taken to Mr. Alden Gibbs for endorsement. 
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There was an assignment already on the note but it was 
crossed out and Mr. Ga wan testified ( T-43) that the 
present endorsement was placed on the note by Mr. 
Gibbs. Mr. Hudson denied that the note had been 
typed in his office. l\'Ir. Hudson, also, does not recall 
whether or not the check for the money that he paid 
for the note had the name of "Alden Gibbs" on it or 
not. Yet, he was purchasing the note from Mr. Gibbs 
- not making a direct loan to Lynn Gawan. All of 
this, while, perhaps, immaterial to the main issues in 
this case, simply indicates that this note was, obviously . , 
a device for charging a higher rate of interest than is 
allowed by law. By using the apparent subterfuge of 
purchasing a note at discount, l\Ir. Hudson for $2500.00, 
more or less, expected to receive a return of $3,750.00, 
between October 25, 1962, and December 29, 1962, a 
very nice return indeed. Now, with his hands so obvi-
ously dirty in this transaction, Mr. Hudson would ask 
that the Ciurt enforce this usurious document and make 
the Defendant, who has acted in good faith on this 
matter from the beginning, pay a sum of money twice--
once to the person who is entitled to receive it (General 
Builders Supply Company) and, secondly, to the 
Plaintiff in this action, who is, obviously, not entitled 
to receive it. 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude by ref erring to the Memorandum 
Decision of Judge Stewart M. Hanson below (R-16A) 
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1. The Assignment was an Assignment of Earn-
ings only and not of the entire proceeds of the con-
tract. 
2. The Plaintiff was paid when he received and 
accepted a check for $15,300.00. 
3. The Defendant is entitled to the benefit of 
Rule 13 (j) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and was 
entitled to offset any sums due for materials that had 
not been paid by Lynn Gawan. 
KIRTON & BETTILYON 
Respectfully submitted, 
Verden E. Bettilyon 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Respondent 
336 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Mailed two copies of the fore going Brief to John 
Elwood Dennett, Attorney for Plaintiff and Appel-
lant, 1243 East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
9th day of August, 1965. 
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